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Introduction
TWO FRIENDS ARE DRIVING HOME after a night on the town. A
few miles from their freeway exit, they see a sign that reads “Drug
Checkpoint 1 Mile Ahead.” There is nothing to worry about—neither
party is carrying contraband and the driver is sober. But their exit is
only a few miles away and the weary travelers want to avoid the hassle
of a stop. The driver takes the first exit he sees after the sign; much to
his surprise, he encounters a drug checkpoint located at the bottom
of the off-ramp. The bewildered driver turns to his companion and
asks; “Can they do that?”
Regardless of whether law enforcement can use such tactics, they
have. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,1 the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down suspicionless checkpoints when employed primarily for the in-
terdiction of drug trafficking. The Court, however, left a loophole for
law enforcement and approved the use of narcotics checkpoints
under the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio:2 “When law enforce-
ment authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at
checkpoints . . . stops can only be justified by some quantum of individ-
ualized suspicion.”3
Using Edmond as a guidepost, several states have attempted to
manufacture the requisite individualized suspicion by designing
“ruse” narcotics checkpoints. Law enforcement officers post signs on a
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1. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
2. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
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freeway leading drivers to believe a narcotics checkpoint is one mile
ahead, but the checkpoint is actually located at the bottom of the first
off-ramp following the ruse sign. Individuals who take the first exit are
stopped at the checkpoint based on the assumption that they exited
deliberately to avoid the checkpoint—thus, exhibiting suspicious be-
havior. While most federal circuits find such stops unconstitutional,4
at least one state supreme court has approved their use.5
Ruse drug checkpoints have been challenged successfully on two
grounds: (1) the stop was made without reasonable suspicion; and (2)
even if there was reasonable suspicion, it was manufactured by the
officers.6 This Comment argues these flaws are not fatal to the general
ruse drug checkpoint design. In fact, several federal courts have ap-
proved the constitutionality of these checkpoints when slight modifi-
cations are made to the original checkpoint design; i.e., using a traffic
violation to justify a stop for narcotics interdiction or stopping only
those drivers who exhibit additional suspicious behavior in response
to the ruse drug checkpoint.7
This Comment argues the new wave of approval for modified
checkpoints cannot be explained by some imagined change in indi-
vidualized suspicion. Rather, this difference illustrates the true ideo-
logical justification underlying Fourth Amendment protections.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has encompassed two ambits of
protections.  First, the Fourth Amendment has been used to provide
individual privacy protection; that is, it has been used to recognize
that individuals have a fundamental right to keep secrets in certain
circumstances. On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment has also
been construed as a set of restrictions for law enforcement. For exam-
ple, warranted searches indicate that invasions of privacy will be toler-
ated so long as law enforcement agents follow proper process and
stick to certain preapproved modes of investigation.
This second formulation of the Fourth Amendment helps explain
the approval of modified ruse drug checkpoints, despite their superfi-
cial changes. Such approval indicates that courts are not concerned
with a fundamental Fourth Amendment protection of individual pri-
vacy, but rather are only concerned with restricting law enforcement
to preapproved avenues of investigation when invading an individual’s
4. See United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998).
5. See State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706 (Mo. 2002) (Stith, J., dissenting).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.B.3.
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privacy. The concept of the ruse drug checkpoint—stopping individu-
als who raise the suspicion of narcotics trafficking—is not “unconstitu-
tional” per se. That is, the Fourth Amendment does not protect that
ambit of individual secrecy. Rather, law enforcement must employ
ruse drug checkpoints using a preapproved and standardized method
of investigation in order to be permissible. Modified ruse drug check-
points differ from their predecessors because they use such tactics, not
because they magically root out greater individualized suspicion.
Part I reviews the progression of U.S. Supreme and Circuit Courts
case law in building the foundation for ruse drug checkpoints. Part II
describes ruse drug checkpoints in their original form and discusses
the opposition to them. Part III reviews the challenges to ruse drug
checkpoints, as originally designed, and discusses the various modifi-
cations made. This Part further notes that several state law enforce-
ment agencies have implemented the modifications suggested herein
and courts reviewing subsequent challenges to them have approved
their use.8 Part IV compares the differences between originally de-
signed and modified checkpoints and argues the slight changes in op-
eration are superficial. Part V reviews the two competing ideologies
underlying the Fourth Amendment and suggests that modified check-
points are being validated because they restrict law enforcement to
specific investigation tactics that are more conventional than the de-
ceptive ruse drug checkpoints—not because they provide a greater
level of individual suspicion to justify the intrusion.
8. United States v. Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 552–53 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that a driver’s
exit at a ruse drug checkpoint was valid and could be used in justifying a prolonged deten-
tion during which the officer developed reasonable suspicion and seized contraband
found in the vehicle); United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding
that a driver’s seizure after exiting at a ruse drug checkpoint was constitutional when in
conjunction with a traffic violation for failing to stop at the stop sign at the bottom of the
exit ramp); United States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
driver’s exit at a ruse drug checkpoint was one factor in establishing the constitutionality of
the seizure, and considering—along with the driver’s exit at the ruse drug checkpoint—
the driver’s assertion that he was looking for a gas station despite the lack of signage indi-
cating gas services, and the driver’s stop along the side of the exit for no apparent reason);
United States v. Flynn, 309 F.3d 736, 739 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that “[t]he posting of
signs to create a ruse does not constitute illegal police activity,” and thus the officers could
constitutionally recover contraband recovered after driver abandoned it in response to
seeing a ruse drug checkpoint sign).
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I. The Foundational Vehicle Checkpoint Law
The Fourth Amendment confers the right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.9 This is not an unconditional right.
The Supreme Court marked a limit on the Fourth Amendment when
it recognized “a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and
in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investi-
gating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable
cause to make an arrest.”10 In Terry, a thirty-nine year veteran police
officer working in a high-crime neighborhood observed two men ex-
hibit behavior he believed consistent with planning a “stick-up.”11
Though the officer could not articulate a basis for his suspicion, he
stopped the two men and subsequently arrested them after he found
incriminating evidence. The Supreme Court found this investigatory
detention valid, despite the absence of probable cause, as long as the
“police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot.”12
State law enforcement officers have stretched Terry to justify other
law enforcement practices; particularly within the area of checkpoint
stops.13 A checkpoint stop—stopping all traffic on a thoroughfare for
a brief investigation—constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.14 Although the Supreme Court confirmed
Terry’s logic as appropriate for stops of individuals, such a standard
was over-burdensome for stops of automobiles because “one’s expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile . . . [is] significantly different from
the traditional expectation of privacy.”15 The Supreme Court deter-
mined that several different types of vehicle checkpoints, serving com-
pelling governmental interests, may be made in the absence of
individualized suspicion.16 Despite these exceptions, the Court subse-
quently limited the breadth of this checkpoint departure.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 30.
13. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706 (Mo. 2002).
14. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
15. Id. at 561.
16. See, e.g., id. at 543 (finding the government’s interest in policing the Nation’s bor-
ders by designing roadblocks for intercepting illegal aliens constitutional); see also Mich.
Dept. of St. Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (finding the government’s interest in pro-
moting highway safety by designing roadblocks for checking driver sobriety constitutional);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (finding the government’s interest in promoting
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In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,17 the Indianapolis police set up a
vehicle checkpoint designed primarily to “interdict unlawful drugs.”18
Each checkpoint stopped a predetermined number of motorists. As a
car stopped, an officer approached the vehicle and looked for circum-
stances consistent with drug trafficking. The officer was permitted to
continue the detention or request a search of the vehicle if he devel-
oped some quantum of individualized suspicion during the stop. Im-
portantly, such suspicion was not necessary to effectuate the stop in
the first place. In finding these stops unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court “decline[d] to suspend the usual requirement of individualized
suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for
the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes.”19 However, the Court
carefully qualified its decision by allowing such stops to proceed when
some quantum of individualized suspicion was present.20
II. Ruse Drug Checkpoints As Originally Designed
A. The Ruse Drug Checkpoint Form
Using Edmond as a guidepost, several states have attempted to
manufacture the requisite individualized suspicion by designing ruse
narcotics checkpoints. These “first generation” ruse drug checkpoints
are identically designed. Law enforcement officers, acting on written
directives from the Chief of Police, set up a sign on a freeway that
advises drivers of a narcotics checkpoint a mile or so ahead. In fact,
the checkpoint is not on the highway as the signs suggest, but rather it
is at the bottom of the off-ramp of the first exit following the notice of
the checkpoint. Drivers who exit after the checkpoint signs are
stopped and then arrested if evidence of narcotics trafficking is found
as a result of that stop.
Typically, drivers have argued that the seizure was not supported
by individualized suspicion and therefore was unreasonable. The state
bears the burden of proving the quantum of individualized suspicion
to justify the stop. States have argued that the driver’s action in choos-
ing to avoid the checkpoint and using the off-ramp is sufficient indi-
vidualized suspicion to justify the checkpoint stop at the bottom of the
off-ramp.
highway safety by designing roadblocks for checking drivers’ licenses and registration
constitutional). .
17. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
18. Id. at 34.
19. Id. at 44.
20. See id. at 47.
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The validity of this type of search caused a split in the federal
circuit and among some appellate state courts.21 In determining the
constitutionality of these stops the issue before a reviewing court is
whether the use of ruse drug checkpoint signs creates the quantum of
individualized suspicion necessary to justify the seizure.
B. Challenges to the Original Design
The breadth of case law addressing this issue discusses the meth-
ods that law enforcement agencies use to justify these checkpoints.
First, relying on Illinois v. Wardlow,22 supporters argue the act of exit-
ing is indicative of head-long flight and evasive activity and thus con-
fers individualized suspicion. Second, they argue the circumstances
attending such checkpoints (location, time, characteristics of the exit)
reduce the likelihood the exit was taken for an innocent purpose and
therefore further confers individualized suspicion. Third, supporters
argue the evasive behavior and circumstances of the checkpoint, at
least taken together if unpersuasive on their own, confer individual-
ized suspicion. The weight of authority considering these arguments
have found them insufficient to justify ruse drug checkpoints as origi-
nally designed.
1. Head-Long Flight/Evasive Activity Is Not Enough for a Seizure
In Wardlow, the Supreme Court considered the role of evasive be-
havior in developing individualized suspicion for a seizure.23 Wardlow
fled after police officers observed him standing next to a building in
an area known for narcotics trafficking. The Court held that
“[h]eadlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of
evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is cer-
tainly suggestive of such.”24 The Court noted this behavior, combined
with other factors, might confer the quantum of individualized suspi-
cion necessary to justify a stop, but then found the “propriety of the
arrest itself” was not before the Court.25
Law enforcement agencies argue the act of flight justifies a
seizure. In United States v. Lester,26 Lester was arrested for driving while
21. Compare United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002), and United States v.
Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998), with State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706 (Mo. 2002).
22. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 124–25.
25. Id. at 124, 126.
26. 148 F. Supp. 2d 597, 598 (D. Md. 2001).
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intoxicated after being stopped by police because he had made a U-
turn to avoid a military checkpoint.27 The District Court of Maryland
determined the U-turn was suspicious behavior, but not suspicious
enough to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.28 The court did
note that a finding of individualized suspicion would have been more
likely if the driver had made the U-turn and had driven erratically.29
When reviewing a similar stop, the Fourth Circuit also qualified that if
a U-turn was coupled with other suspicious behaviors to form a “series
of evasive actions,” then that might be sufficient to support a finding
of reasonable suspicion.30
In both cases, the court determined that flight alone is not suspi-
cious enough for a detention and that factors in addition to flight
were necessary to justify the seizure.31
2. Eliminating Most Innocent Drivers with Unusual Checkpoint
Circumstances Is Not Enough for a Seizure
The design of the checkpoint “must serve to eliminate a substan-
tial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasona-
ble suspicion will be satisfied.”32 Only when the ruse checkpoint is
designed specifically so that “drivers with drugs do indeed ‘take the
bait,’” can the exit confer individualized suspicion.33 Reducing the
number of innocent travelers is critical because “[g]eneral profiles
that fit large numbers of innocent people do not establish reasonable
suspicion.”34
Proponents of ruse checkpoints argue that, while the checkpoints
must be effective in eliminating innocent people to confer reasonable-
ness on the seizure, “Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop inno-
cent people.”35 Thus, an officer can have reasonable suspicion without
altogether ruling out the possibility of innocent conduct.36
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with this logic as specifically applied
to ruse drug checkpoints. The court found “the mere fact that some
27. Id. at 599.
28. Id. at 605.
29. Id.
30. United States v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579, 585–87 (4th Cir. 2005) (the seizure of a
driver who evasively maneuvered into a stranger’s driveway to avoid police roadblock was
reasonable within the Fourth Amendment).
31. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
32. United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 361 (4th Cir. 2000).
33. See State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002).
34. United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2002).
35. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126.
36. United States v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 2005).
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vehicles took the exit under such circumstances does not . . . create
individualized reasonable suspicion of illegal activity as to every one of
them” because “while some drivers may have wanted to avoid being
caught for drug trafficking, many more took the exit for wholly inno-
cent reasons . . . .”37 In United States v. Yousif,38 the Eighth Circuit held
that ruse narcotics checkpoint signs did not create sufficient individu-
alized suspicion, therefore, the seizure was unconstitutional.39 The
court found drivers could have taken the exit because they wanted “to
avoid the inconvenience and delay of being stopped or because it was
part of their intended route.”40 The fact that a driver is “traveling on a
highway that was ‘known’ to the officers as a drug trafficking corridor
cannot alone justify the stop because ‘[t]oo many people fit this
description for it to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.’”41
A checkpoint only creates individual suspicion when it is specifi-
cally designed to eliminate a large portion of innocent travelers.42 Al-
though it is true that an officer with reasonable suspicion need not
rule out the possibility of innocent conduct entirely,43 the tenuous
nature of a finding of individualized suspicion on ruse checkpoints is
fatally weakened when the factors used to justify the stop also catch
large numbers of innocent people.
3. The Totality of the Circumstances Is Not Enough for a Seizure
The U.S. Supreme Court found individualized suspicion “where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot.”44 In finding some quantum of individualized suspicion, “re-
viewing courts must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each
case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and ob-
jective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”45 In United States v.
Arvizu,46 a Border Patrol agent observed a vehicle on a remote side
route that avoided the main thoroughfare and an immigration check-
37. Yousif, 308 F.3d at 827–28.
38. Id. at 827–29.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 828.
41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. Id.
43. See United States v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 2005).
44. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
45. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 266.
Spring 2010] RUSE DRUG CHECKPOINTS & THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 963
point. This route was notorious for drug trafficking, the car the driver
used was a vehicle like those typically used for smuggling, and the
driver’s behavior was suspicious.47 Based on the aggregation of these
factors, the patrol officer stopped the vehicle and subsequently ar-
rested the driver after discovering illegal narcotics in the vehicle. The
Court noted “each of these factors alone is susceptible of innocent
explanation,” however, when taken together they provide reasonable
suspicion to effectuate the stop.48
In applying the totality of the circumstances test specifically to
ruse drug checkpoints, the Supreme Court of Missouri found the
seizure at the checkpoint was based on reasonable suspicion.49 In State
v. Mack,50 police officers operating a ruse drug checkpoint on a
Thursday night observed Todd Mack traveling northbound on the
highway.51 After passing the ruse signs, Mack suddenly “shot over and
almost missing it came up the off ramp . . . [while] moving [at] a
pretty good pace.”52 While detained at the checkpoint, officers ob-
served Mack was “nervous, had glazed and bloodshot eyes, and
smelled of alcohol.”53 A search of the vehicle pursuant to probable
cause obtained during the checkpoint seizure revealed narcotics. The
Supreme Court of Missouri found the checkpoint seizure was reasona-
ble. The court determined there were “significant efforts to reduce
the legitimate reasons for taking the exit”—it was “set up in an iso-
lated and sparsely populated area offering no services to motorists and
was conducted on an evening that would otherwise have little traffic.”
It also considered Mack’s “particular conduct in exiting at the check-
point”—he “suddenly veered off onto the off ramp” and “almost
missed the turn[.]”54
The Supreme Court of Missouri is the only court that has ac-
cepted this line of reasoning. Other courts who have considered this
issue have rejected this argument because “these circumstances never
would have arisen but for the existence of the illegal checkpoint.”55 In
fact, other courts have found that any “individualized suspicion” in an
exit at a ruse drug checkpoint cannot be used to justify the seizure
47. Id. at 269–70.
48. Id. at 277–78.
49. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Mo. 2002).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 707.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 708.
54. Id. at 709–10.
55. United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 829 (8th Cir. 2002).
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because it has been manufactured by the state.56 As one judge ex-
plained, it is the state’s behavior in designing a constitutionally unten-
able checkpoint that is suspicious and the individual’s response is
reasonable.57 Further, aggregating facts like, as in Mack, the driver’s
swerve upon exit or the driver’s appearance upon seizure58 is no more
than “an after-the-fact rationalization made to justify a stop that was
clearly based on the fact that [the driver] exited the highway” at the
ruse drug checkpoint exit.59 As such, the court noted the following:
[I]t is a contradiction in terms to say that police had a basis for
“individualized” suspicion of a motorist by setting up a checkpoint
that had the admitted programmatic purpose of searching for
those engaged in drug-related activity, yet stopped all those who
exited the highway at a certain point.60
Further, even if the ruse drug checkpoint produces some kind of
suspicion, it is “group suspicion,” not the individualized suspicion re-
quired by the Fourth Amendment for a seizure.61 Therefore, the sum
total of the driver’s evasive behavior and the circumstances of the ruse
drug checkpoint do not confer the requisite quantum of individual-
ized suspicion necessary for a seizure to be constitutional.
4. These Criticisms Are Not Persuasive
In Edmond, the Supreme Court “decline[d] to suspend the usual
requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to em-
ploy a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigat-
ing crimes[,]”62 but allowed such stops to proceed when “justified by
some quantum of individualized suspicion.”63 Relying on this loop-
hole, states have attempted to manufacture the requisite individual-
ized suspicion by designing “ruse” narcotics checkpoints. Proponents
of these ruse checkpoints make three recurring arguments for their
constitutionality, but the weight of authority in this area has disap-
proved of these checkpoints as originally designed. Nevertheless, as
discussed infra Part III, these checkpoints can be effective and consti-
tutional with slight modifications.
56. Id.
57. See Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 717 (Stith, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 720.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 714.
61. Id.
62. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
63. Id. at 47.
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III. Modified Ruse Drug Checkpoints that Differ from Their
Predecessors in Only Two Ways Are Constitutional
A. The Modifications
Law enforcement agencies have attempted to remedy the inade-
quacies of ruse drug checkpoints as originally designed. In designing
constitutional ruse drug checkpoints, law enforcement has changed
only two factors. First, the inevitability of the stop has been removed.
Law enforcement could not legitimately say a motorist was stopped
because of their individually suspicious behavior because, regardless
of the behavior exhibited, motorists were stopped without exception
at the bottom of the exit. Second, at a typical ruse drug checkpoint,
law enforcement officers were only positioned at the bottom of the
exit. From the bottom of the exit, officers are neither able to observe
suspicious behavior in response to the sign nor dismiss the behavior of
an innocent motorist legitimately taking the exit. For this reason, in
modified checkpoints, an officer has been strategically placed on the
freeway to observe drivers’ response to the sign. Repositioning law en-
forcement personnel in this way has allowed them to constitutionally
stop individually suspicious motorists in one of two ways: when the
driver commits a traffic violation in conjunction with the exit or when
the driver exhibits a quantum of individually suspicious behavior justi-
fying seizure.
Law enforcement agencies argue these two factors remedy the
constitutional inadequacies of first generation ruse drug checkpoints
because they provide enough reasonable suspicion to validate the
checkpoint. They argue that these new checkpoints strike a more even
balance between the public interest served and the intrusion on the
private individual. These checkpoints have been approved on several
different occasions.64
B. The Constitutionality of the Modified Design
1. Traffic Violations Create Automatically Justifiable Stops
Traffic violations, even minor infractions, create probable cause
to stop the driver of a vehicle.65 For that reason, drivers who commit
traffic violations in conjunction with an exit at a ruse drug checkpoint
could be constitutionally seized without a finding of individualized sus-
picion. Even if a driver is stopped only for offending traffic laws, his
64. See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text.
65. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).
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vehicle can be searched for drugs provided the search does not ex-
tend the stop longer than necessary to effectuate its actual purpose of
issuing a citation.66 The constitutionality of this stop is not affected by
the fact that the traffic stop serves as a pretext to search for drugs or
by the fact that the police manufactured the circumstances surround-
ing the stop.67
There has never been a dispute that stopping a motorist for a
traffic violation, however minor, is a valid and constitutional exercise
of police power.68 The obvious criticism of this design is that these
stops are a pretext for narcotics searches.69 Backing this criticism is
the fear that routine traffic stops will “automatically becom[e] a foot
in the door for all investigatory purposes . . . .”70 The Supreme Court
considered and dismissed this issue, holding “[n]ot only have we
never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative
inspection . . . , that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifia-
ble behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly
held and asserted the contrary.”71 The Court has continually reiter-
ated that “a traffic-violation arrest . . . would not be rendered invalid
by the fact that it was ‘a mere pretext for a narcotics search[.]’”72
These cases lead to the inescapable conclusion that the Supreme
66. United States v. Waldron, 178 F. Supp. 2d 738, 743–44 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (citing
United States v. Machuaca-Berrera, 261 F.3d 425, 432 (5th Cir. 2001)).
67. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810–13
(1996)).
68. United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir. 1998). Importantly, a driver
stopped for this minor reason can only be stopped as long as necessary to complete the
purpose of the stop—that is, only long enough for the officer to issue a citation or release
the driver with a warning. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407–08 (2005); see also Beck, 140
F.3d at 1134 (“[U]nless Officer Taylor had a reasonably articulable suspicion for believing
that criminal activity was afoot, continued detention of Beck became unreasonable after he
had finished processing Beck’s traffic violation.”); United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162
(6th Cir. 1995) (“Once the purposes of the initial traffic stop were completed, there is no
doubt that the officer could not further detain the vehicle or its occupants unless some-
thing that occurred during the traffic stop generated the necessary reasonable suspicion to
justify a further detention.”). The most efficient way to effectuate an investigation for drug
related activity during the small window of time left open to complete the purpose of the
traffic stop is with the use of a drug-detection canine. The use of a narcotics canine does
not extend the nature or scope of the stop beyond what would already be permitted in
response to the traffic violation, since “[t]he fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection
dog around the exterior of each car at [a checkpoint] does not transform the seizure into
a search.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
69. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 415 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996).
72. Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973)); see also Ed-
mond, 531 U.S. at 45.
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Court “flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to
strip the agents of their legal justification.”73
Seizing a driver for a traffic violation in conjunction with a ruse
drug checkpoint sign is the most straightforward way to effectuate a
constitutional ruse drug checkpoint. A driver committing even the
slightest of traffic infractions may be validly stopped.74 The Supreme
Court approved similar stops, even though they could be considered
pretexts for drug interdiction.75 The purpose of a ruse drug check-
point could, therefore, be constitutionally achieved by using this new
design.
2. There Is Individualized Suspicion to Stop, Even Without a
Traffic Violation
If a driver commits a traffic violation in conjunction with exiting
at a ruse drug checkpoint, that driver’s seizure will surely meet consti-
tutional muster.76 However, even if a driver commits no traffic viola-
tion, a seizure would be justified if a driver’s response to the ruse drug
checkpoint sign is individually suspicious.77 At issue are the kinds of
observations sufficient to create the requisite quantum of individual-
ized suspicion necessary to justify the stop.78
Law enforcement officers operating ruse drug checkpoints, as
originally designed, relied upon a driver’s evasive behavior in re-
sponse to the sign and the circumstances surrounding the checkpoint
like its location, time of day and day of week in an attempt to amass
the quantum of individualized suspicion necessary to justify the stop.79
As discussed,80 these factors alone were insufficient to justify first gen-
eration checkpoint seizures. However, modified ruse drug check-
points that eliminate the inevitability of the stop are constitutional.
No matter what justification was used, every motorist exiting at an
originally designed ruse drug checkpoint was stopped at the bottom
of the off-ramp. The inevitability of the stop eliminated the possibility
of individual suspicion because the driver was stopped regardless of
73. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812.
74. United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)).
75. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–13 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221 n.1); see also Edmond,
531 U.S. at 45.
76. See supra Part III.A.
77. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
78. See id.
79. See supra Parts II.A–C.
80. See supra Part II.E.
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the behavior exhibited. For this reason, not only should law enforce-
ment refrain from stopping every vehicle exiting the freeway, but also
an officer should be strategically placed on the freeway so that he may
observe drivers’ responses to the sign.
Substantially, the layout of the ruse drug checkpoint should re-
main the same. Law enforcement officers should operate on a freeway
known for drug trafficking. They should place a sign on that freeway
indicating “DRUG CHECKPOINT ONE MILE AHEAD.” The sign
should be placed right before a “dead exit” where there are no ser-
vices offered and few legitimate reasons to take the exit. Officers
should position themselves at the bottom of the exit, posed to stop
motorists leaving the freeway. These officers, however, should not stop
every motorist venturing down the exit. Additionally, an officer should
be strategically placed at the top of the exit, acting as a lookout, watch-
ing drivers react to the ruse checkpoint sign. The lookout should
watch for drivers committing a traffic violation when exiting the free-
way and for drivers reacting evasively to the sign. The lookout should
then inform the officers at the bottom of the exit which cars should be
stopped on the basis of his observations. With this new design, law
enforcement officers could efficiently and constitutionally stop motor-
ists who either commit traffic violations in response to the sign or re-
act evasively to it. Repositioning law enforcement personnel in this
way would allow them to constitutionally stop motorists who exhibit
individually suspicious behavior in direct response to seeing the ruse
drug checkpoint sign.
Without an inevitable stop, the duration of the stop at a ruse drug
checkpoint is uniformly shorter and the number of innocent motor-
ists stopped is reduced. Therefore, this modification combined with
the factors used to justify ruse drug checkpoints, as discussed supra
Part II, and the considerable deference given to law enforcement of-
ficers,81 garners enough individualized suspicion to establish
constitutionality.
The Supreme Court has given law enforcement officers great def-
erence.82 The Court held, “for purposes of Fourth Amendment analy-
sis, the choice among [what methods to apprehend drivers engaging
in illegal conduct] remains with the governmental officials who have a
unique understanding of, and [a] responsibility for, limited public re-
81. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453–54 (1990).
82. See id.
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sources, including a finite number of police officers.”83 Since the “rea-
sonable suspicion standard is based largely on the common sense and
experience of the investigating officer[,]”84 a law enforcement of-
ficer’s observations are given even greater weight when used to find
the quantum of individualized suspicion necessary to justify a seizure.
Upon review of a checkpoint seizure, the court views the facts support-
ing the officer’s determination in the light most favorable to the of-
ficer.85 In other words, when an officer determines there is enough
individualized suspicion in an exit at a ruse drug checkpoint, his de-
termination is given the benefit of the doubt even when reasonable
minds may differ.86 Therefore a finding of individualized suspicion at
a ruse drug checkpoint is reasonable given the minimal intrusion on
the driver when the inevitability of the stop is removed and the great
deference to an officer in making determinations on which drivers to
stop.87
3. Acceptance of Modified Ruse Drug Checkpoints
Ruse drug checkpoints, modified as suggested herein, have al-
ready been accepted in a variety of different jurisdictions.88 In 2002,
the Tenth Circuit determined that “[t]he posting of signs to create a
ruse does not constitute illegal police activity.”89 In United States v.
Flynn,90 Flynn exited the freeway right after passing ruse drug check-
point signs.91 Law enforcement officers positioned on the freeway ob-
served Flynn exit and exhibit suspicious behavior.92 They radioed this
information to other officers who were positioned on the exit ramp
83. Id. (finding that courts that should not be making “the decision as to which
among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal
with a serious public danger[,]” but rather that determination is properly made by law
enforcement officials).
84. United States v. Lester, 148 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2001) (citing United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1136 (8th Cir. 1998) (“It is not necessary
that the behavior on which reasonable suspicion is grounded be susceptible only to an
interpretation of guilt . . . .”).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 467 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Flynn, 309 F.3d 736, 738
(10th Cir. 2002).
89. Flynn, 309 F.3d at 738.
90. Id. at 736.
91. Id. at 737.
92. Id.
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and who effectuated Flynn’s seizure.93 The Tenth Circuit found law
enforcement’s use of ruse checkpoint signs did not violate Flynn’s
Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures.94
More recently, the Eighth Circuit has approved the modifications
to ruse drug checkpoints. This is significant because the Eighth Cir-
cuit leveled the most criticism at ruse drug checkpoints as originally
designed.95 In 2006, the court reviewed three checkpoints where of-
ficers posted ruse signs on the freeway, then observed traffic exiting,
and tried “to get a reason to stop them.”96 On one occasion, the of-
ficer observed a motorist exiting the freeway and decided that the ve-
hicle “just didn’t look right for the area[.]”97 When the car stopped at
the bottom of the exit, the officer approached it.98 The court found
this initial encounter was not a seizure99 until the officer later asked
the driver to exit his vehicle.100 In finding the seizure constitutional,
the court found the driver’s suspicious behavior in exiting after ob-
serving checkpoint signs combined with the fact that he had taken an
exit with no available services, when viewed in the totality of the cir-
cumstances, provided sufficient justification to subject the driver to a
brief detention and dog sniff.101 On another occasion, state patrol
troopers observed a driver exiting the freeway immediately after spot-
ting ruse drug checkpoint signs.102 After he failed to make a complete
stop for the stop sign at the top of the exit ramp, troopers pulled him
over.103 In approving the use of ruse drug checkpoint signs in this
instance, the Eighth Circuit distinguished this new kind of stop from
prior drug checkpoints.104 The court reasoned that the new check-
points lacked the inevitable seizure that invalidated its predecessor.105
Finally, in a similar case filed a mere couple of months later, the
Eighth Circuit reaffirmed, under the totality of the circumstances, the
fact that “the vehicle exited the interstate at a ruse checkpoint” com-
bined with other suspicious conduct gave the officer sufficient justifi-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 738–39.
95. United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002).
96. United States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2006).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 985.
100. Id. at 986.
101. Id. at 986–87.
102. United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 467 (8th Cir. 2008).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 471.
105. Id.
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cation to effectuate a stop and investigate further.106 In these three
cases, modified ruse drug checkpoints garnered the approval of the
circuit that had been most critical of the originally designed ruse drug
checkpoints. The Eighth Circuit’s acceptance is the most compelling
evidence of the validity the modifications suggested herein to ruse
drug checkpoints.107
IV. Modified Checkpoints Are Not Any Less Intrusive on the
Individual
Modified ruse drug checkpoints have gained court approval
where their predecessors did not. But such approval may be unde-
served, given the fact that the layout of the ruse drug checkpoint re-
mains substantially the same. Law enforcement officers are still
operating on major thoroughfares for drug trafficking and they are
still using deceptive signs to lead drivers into dead exits. There are
only two major differences: (1) positioning an officer at the top of the
ramp with the hope that he may be able to observe a driver’s evasive
behavior in response to the ruse checkpoint sign; and (2) removing
the inevitability of the stop at the bottom of the ramp. Courts approv-
ing these modified ruse drug checkpoints argue the imposition on an
individual’s privacy interest is now reduced given the abbreviated du-
ration of the stop and the decreased probability that law enforcement
will accidentally stop innocent drivers. Thus, those courts have deter-
mined modified checkpoints now garner enough individualized suspi-
cion to establish constitutionality.108
No court, however, has held that there is a quantifiable increase
in individualized suspicion justifying a stop at a modified ruse drug
checkpoint as opposed to an originally designed ruse drug check-
point. Rather, the rhetoric employed is that these stops are less intru-
sive on individuals—despite the fact that the number of factors
aggregated to find suspicion remains the same. Courts instead argue
that modified checkpoints are more “reasonable,” and the public in-
terest served outweighs the minimal intrusion on the individual.
The reasonableness of a seizure depends “on a balance between
the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free
from arbitrary interference by law officers.”109 Ruse drug checkpoints
106. United States v. Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 554 (8th Cir. 2008).
107. Compare Wright, 512 F.3d at 466, and Loya, 528 F.3d at 546, with United States v.
Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 820 (8th Cir. 2002).
108. See supra Part II.
109. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (citation omitted).
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serve the weighty public interest of crime prevention.110 In 2002, drug
abuse cost the United States $180.9 billion.111 In a “2001 National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 15.9 million Americans ages 12
and older (7.1%) reported using an illicit drug in the month before
the survey was conducted . . . and 41.7% reported some use of an
illicit drug at least once during their lifetimes.”112 In 2007, this num-
ber jumped to 19.9 million Americans (or 8%).113 Even the Supreme
Court has acknowledged, “traffic in illegal narcotics creates social
harms of the first magnitude.”114 “[T]he myriad forms of spin-off
crime that it spawns” allows the drug trade to “remain daunting and
complex.”115 Further, the Court conceded “[t]here is no doubt that
traffic in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the first magnitude”
and “[t]he detection and punishment of almost any criminal offense
serves broadly the safety of the community, and our streets would no
doubt be safer but for the scourge of illegal drugs.”116 Thus, the Court
found the fact that ruse drug “roadblocks serve . . . legitimate state
interests cannot be serious be seriously disputed[.]”117 But the Court
went on to find that it “cannot sanction stops justified only by the
generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspec-
tion may reveal that any given motorist has committed some
crime.”118
There are four compelling arguments that ruse drug check-
points, whether in their modified or original form, are severely intru-
sive on individual liberties. First, pages of scholarship have been
devoted to haranguing the evils of “deceptive drug checkpoints.”119
110. Id. at 52.
111. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., National Drug Threat Assessment 2006: The Impact of
Drugs on Society, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs11/18862/impact.htm (last visited May
10, 2010).
112. Michele Spiess, Drug Data Summary March 2003, ONDCP DRUG POLICY INFORMA-
TION CLEARINGHOUSE, Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/factsht/drugdata/index.html.
113. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs. Admin. Office of Applied Studs., Re-
sults from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings, DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., Sept. 4, 2008, available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/
2k7NSDUH/2k7results.cfm#Ch2.
114. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 43.
117. Id. at 51 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 44.
119. See, e.g., Daniel R. Dinger & John S. Dinger, Deceptive Drug Checkpoints and Individu-
alized Suspicion: Can Law Enforcement Really Deceive Its Way into a Drug Trafficking Conviction?,
39 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2002); Travis Johnson, Ruse Drug Checkpoints: How the Government’s False
Advertising May Diminish Your Fourth Amendment Rights, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 781 (2005).
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One author argues that ruse checkpoints result in a “sacrifice[ ] to our
personal liberties[,]”120 contending that approval of such checkpoints
is “disturbing . . . because it does not establish any real boundaries for
law enforcement officers . . . .”121 Another concedes that while
“[d]rug trafficking is a very serious problem that needs to be dealt
with, . . . sacrificing Fourth Amendment protections in the name of
victory is not the answer.”122 Additionally, addressing the constitution-
ality of ruse drug checkpoints specifically, the Eighth Circuit noted
that “[r]easonable suspicion cannot be manufactured by the police
themselves.”123
Second, ruse drug checkpoints are even more intrusive on indi-
vidual liberties than suspicionless drug checkpoints because at least
with the latter, “[m]otorists using these highways are not taken by sur-
prise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere.”124 Third, public pol-
icy necessitates limiting the authority of law enforcement because if
“the individual [were to be] subject to unfettered governmental intru-
sion every time he entered an automobile, the security granted by the
Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.”125 Finally,
“[t]here is something fundamentally unsettling and counter-intuitive
about labeling as suspicious a person’s conduct in avoiding the state’s
own unconstitutional conduct.”126 Each of these arguments presents a
strong case for finding that ruse drug checkpoints contravene public
policy.
Public policy mandates that drug trafficking be stopped and traf-
fickers brought to justice. But public policy demands adherence to
constitutional protections. With weighty constitutional considerations
on the one hand, “the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive
of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may
employ to pursue a given purpose.”127 Therefore, despite the value
120. Kathryn L. Howard, Stop in the Name of that Checkpoint: Sacrificing Our Fourth Amend-
ment Right in Order to Prevent Criminal Activity, 68 MO. L. REV. 485, 485 (2003).
121. Id. at 504.
122. Luke R. Spellmeier, Bypassing the Fourth Amendment: The Missouri Supreme Court’s
Use of “Ruse” Reasonable Suspicion to Justify De Facto Drug Interdiction Checkpoints, 42 WASHBURN
L.J. 209, 209 (2002).
123. United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 829 (8th Cir. 2002).
124. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976); see also United States v.
Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 560–61 (6th Cir 1998).
125. Deleware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
126. State v. Mack, 66 S.W. 3d 706, 717 (Mo. 2002) (Stith, J., dissenting).
127. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).
974 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
these checkpoints have in terms of public protection,128 the Supreme
Court rightly decided that it “cannot sanction stops justified only by
the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and in-
spection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some
crime.”129 Ruse drug checkpoints, whether in their modified or origi-
nal form, are intrusive on individual privacy.
V. What Does the Fourth Amendment Really Protect?
Ruse drug checkpoints are inevitably intrusive, irrespective of
whether they are modified or originally designed. Yet, they are re-
ceived, depending on their form, quite differently by courts: modified
stops are approved and originally designed checkpoints are not. The
divergence in treatment suggests that courts are not really concerned
with protecting the fundamental purity of individual rights. But what
then does the Fourth Amendment really protect? Depending on how
it is formulated, the Fourth Amendment acts as either a protection of
fundamental rights or a set of prohibitions for law enforcement.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”130 An entire
body of scholarship is devoted to parsing the nuances of the Amend-
ment and the protections it provides.
On the one hand, the Fourth Amendment is arguably a tool for
privacy protection. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia articulated
this proposition clearly, when he explained the purpose of the
Amendment “is to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of
persons and the inviolability of their property . . . .”131 In Minnesota v.
Dickerson,132 the Supreme Court reviewed the frisk of an individual for
contraband during a Terry-stop.133 The majority found that the search
went beyond the bounds marked by Terry because the officer did more
than pat-down the suspect. He also detected a small lump in the sus-
pect’s pocket and squeezed and manipulated it to determine its iden-
tity, despite the fact he knew it was not a weapon.134 In his
128. Id. at 43 (noting that “[t]he detection and punishment of almost any criminal
offense serves broadly the safety of the community, and our streets would no doubt be safer
but for the scourge of illegal drugs”).
129. Id. at 44.
130. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
131. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
132. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
133. Id. at 379.
134. Id. at 369.
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concurrence, Justice Scalia emphasized the inviolability of individual
privacy in one’s person and belongings when there is no cause for
arrest.135 From this perspective, the doctrine operates on the pre-
sumption that individuals have a fundamental right to keep secrets
and that right must be protected.
The alternative perspective is that the Fourth Amendment oper-
ates as a set of restrictions for law enforcement, rather than as an ide-
alistic preservation of individual rights. Proponents of this proposition
explain that the doctrine merely limits the intrusion to specific modes
of investigatory activity. “What the Fourth Amendment protects[,]”
the Supreme Court has said, “is the security a man relies upon when
he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area . . . from unwarranted governmental intrusion.”136 Importantly,
this is not an absolute protection of the individual. Rather, it is an
observation that “the police must obtain a warrant when they intend
to seize an object outside the scope of [any other preapproved means,
such as] a valid search incident to arrest . . . .”137
Drug checkpoints exemplify the latter principle and show that
courts are not concerned with the fundamental right to individual pri-
vacy. Drug interdiction by law enforcement is permissible so long as it
is reasonable. A solution is “reasonable” if the gravity of the public
interest served outweighs the intrusion on individual liberties.138
In Edmond, the Supreme Court determined that suspicionless nar-
cotics checkpoints were not a “reasonable” solution because, despite
the weighty public interest, they unduly infringed on the individual’s
rights.139 The Eighth Circuit initially placed similar weight on an indi-
vidual’s right to privacy, as the most vocal opponent of ruse drug
checkpoints.140 Even though they articulated the same rhetoric,
neither the Edmond Court nor the Eighth Circuit was concerned with
the purity of individual privacy. The Supreme Court did not say that
individuals have an absolute right to secrecy in the information at
stake, and, in fact, it could not articulate such a rule. On various occa-
sions, the Court has given very limited privacy protection (if any) to
individuals engaged in drug trading141 or engaged in operating a vehi-
135. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J. concurring).
136. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (emphasis added).
137. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 484 (1971).
138. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (citation omitted).
139. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43–44 (2000).
140. United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2002).
141. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). The Court found that an
individual could be seized for avoiding a police encounter because of the presence of
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cle.142 Thus, the Court should have said that such checkpoints were
not reasonable because they overly infringed on the individual.
In disapproving suspicionless checkpoints and ruse drug check-
points as originally designed, courts carefully restricted law enforce-
ment from using investigation tactics that were unduly intrusive—like
those that stopped all traffic on a thoroughfare or that stopped all
traffic that responded to the ruse sign without showing further indi-
vidualized suspicion. Modified checkpoints that use traffic violations
as a pretext for a stop and that remove the inevitability of the stop in
response to the ruse drug checkpoint sign allow officers to achieve the
same intrusions into individuals’ privacy but with court approval.
Rather than stopping every single car on a thoroughfare, only a select
subset of motorists is stopped. Checkpoints are designed to eliminate
a substantial portion of innocent travelers.143 They are operated at a
time of day, day of week, and place where the normal flow of traffic
will not be disturbed.144 Only those who take the ruse drug check-
point exit and exhibit individually suspicious behavior are seized.145
With these modifications, courts have approved the use of ruse drug
checkpoints. In fact, it is this subsequent approval of ruse drug check-
points that most obviously refutes any argument that the Fourth
Amendment is concerned with a fundamental right to individual pri-
vacy. Ruse drug checkpoints still infringe on an individual’s right to
privacy. Yet, the difference between the modified checkpoints and
their predecessors is they intrude on individual privacy less by forcing
restrictions on the investigation tactics used by law enforcement.
Thus, when using reasonable investigation tactics, law enforcement of-
ficers can constitutionally engage in the same intrusion on individual
privacy.
other factors indicating that the individual was engaged in drug trafficking. Without these
factors, the stop would not have been justified.
142. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146 (1925) (holding that the “automobile
exception” of the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless searches of vehicles because,
inter alia, vehicles are presumed to have a lower expectation of privacy since they provide
clear visibility of their contents through their windows and because their primary purpose
is the transportation of people and not of the storage of personal property).
143. See United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 361 (2000) (citing United States v. Soko-
low, 490 U.S. 1, 7–11 (1989)).
144. State v. Mack, 66 S.W. 3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002).
145. See supra Part III.B.
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Conclusion
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,146 the Court prohibited the use
of suspicionless narcotics checkpoints, yet reaffirmed the validity of
traffic stops when officers believe that “criminal activity may be
afoot.”147 Officers failed in their first attempt to manufacture the req-
uisite quantum of individualized suspicion using ruse drug check-
points. Early checkpoints were designed to stop all motorists who
exited the freeway following the ruse drug point sign.148 These
seizures were unconstitutional because (1) they were justified by “af-
ter-the-fact” rationalizations,149 and (2) they were self-contradictory, as
law enforcement officers had to argue that each driver exhibited indi-
vidualized suspicion but then “[stop] all those who exited the highway
at the certain point.”150
By modifying the design of their checkpoints, law enforcement
officers have remedied the inadequacies of first generation ruse drug
checkpoints, and these modified checkpoints have been approved by
several different courts.151 Officers now monitor the flow of traffic
from above the off-ramp and the inevitability of the stop is removed. A
driver may be seized for committing a traffic violation152 and sub-
jected to a canine sniff.153 Or a driver may be seized for exhibiting
suspicious behavior observed by an officer. When an officer’s finding
of suspicion based on these factors is given proper deference,154 it
outweighs the minimal intrusion of the stop. Thus, ruse drug check-
points—as modified—pass constitutional muster where their prede-
cessors did not.
The approval of modified checkpoints is a great achievement for
law enforcement, and a telling revelation about the Fourth Amend-
ment. At least in the context of drug interdiction, it means the Fourth
Amendment stands as a restriction on law enforcement rather than a
protection of fundamental individual rights. Modified ruse drug
146. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
147. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
148. See, e.g., Mack, 66 S.W. 3d at 707.
149. Id. at 720 (Stith, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 714.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 467 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Flynn, 309 F.3d 736, 738
(10th Cir. 2002).
152. United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)).
153. United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1999).
154. United States v. Lester, 148 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2001) (citing United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
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checkpoints are not significantly less intrusive on individual privacy
and there is not a significantly greater amount of individualized suspi-
cion garnered in executing the stop.155 Rather, the difference be-
tween permitted and prohibited is whether law enforcement has
followed proper process in intruding on those rights.
155. See supra Part IV.
